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Abstract
We learn regularities in the world around us, frequently without conscious effort, a 
phenomenon known as implicit learning.  These regularities are often impossible to 
verbalize.  One example of implicit learning is the structural effect, in which participants 
learn a rule set combining two factors, such as lexical frequency and concreteness 
(Higham & Brooks, 1997; Neil & Higham, 2012).  Theories of implicit learning predict 
that repetition of exemplar words would result in improved learning of the rule set, 
increasing the magnitude of the structural effect.  Over four experiments, we demonstrate 
that this is, in fact, not the case.  In Experiments 1 and 2, three repetitions of exemplar 
words results in superior item memory, but no change in the magnitude of the structural 
effect, compared to individually presented words.  In Experiments 3 and 4, the structural 
effect is shown to be invariant to five repetitions of exemplar words and at high and low 
numbers of exemplars. In all four experiments, participants were unable to describe the 
rule set underlying the structural effect.  However, confidence ratings demonstrated 
sensitivity to the structure and this sensitivity, unlike endorsements, increased with 
strength. The results are discussed in reference to differentiation, structural versus 
judgment knowledge, and flexible learning systems.
Keywords:  Implicit Learning; Metacognition; Recognition Memory; Structural 
Effect; Classification
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Repeated Exposure to Exemplars of a Category Does Not Enhance Learning: A 
Puzzle for Models of Learning and Memory
The process of interacting with the world around us requires that we learn and 
retain much knowledge.  A great deal of this knowledge may be acquired without the 
application of deliberate conscious effort and may also be hard to describe explicitly, a 
phenomenon called implicit learning (Frensch, 1998; Higham & Brooks, 1997; Neil & 
Higham, 2012).  Implicit learning is particularly useful for learning about patterns 
embodied in complex materials.  There are many examples of implicit learning of patterns 
and materials in the literature including the grammatical structure underlying consonant 
letter string (Dienes, Broadbent, & Berry, 1991; Reber, 1967), regularities in musical 
patterns (Kuhn & Dienes, 2005) or in Tang poetry (Jiang et al., 2012), and even the 
categorical structure of word lists (Higham & Brooks, 1997; Neil & Higham, 2012). 
However, little attention has been given to how implicit learning might be affected by 
repeating specific learning exemplars, and on what this could mean for theories of implicit 
learning. Thus, the effects of exemplar repetition on implicit learning is the focus of this 
paper.
Investigating Implicit Learning
In a typical implicit learning task, participants memorize or observe a series of 
exemplars that are consistent with a complex structure.  For example, in artificial-
grammar (AG) experiments, exemplars are produced using a finite-state grammar, which 
produces nonsense letter strings (e.g., XYMMV), but under specific constraints (e.g., if 
the first letter is X, the second letter can either be a Y or an M).  After studying the list of 
exemplars, participants are informed that the just-studied list conforms to a set of rules, 
but they are not told the details of the structure.  Instead, they are given a classification 
task, in which they are shown a new list of items, some of which are consistent with the 
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structure (new-consistent, or NC, items) and some of which are not (new-inconsistent, or 
NI, items).  Participants are required to discriminate between the two items types by 
endorsing the items consistent with the structure of the studied exemplars and rejecting 
the items that are not. Many studies have shown that classification responses in implicit 
learning experiments are made with above-chance accuracy, but participants typically are 
unable to explicitly describe the basis of their responding (e.g., Neil & Higham, 2012; 
Reber, 1989; Scott & Dienes, 2008). 
Alternatively, implicit learning can also be measured using a serial reaction-time 
(SRT) task, in which participants watch a series of individual dots appearing successively 
on screen, and are asked to respond as quickly as possible by pressing a key indicating 
where on the screen each dot appears (e.g., Norman, Price, Duff, & Mentzoni, 2007; 
Rowland & Shanks, 2006; Song, Howard, & Howard, 2008). Performance in these tasks 
is measured by response time, with implicit learning being demonstrated because 
participants respond faster when the dots appear in a structured pattern than when they do 
not.   
Another example of implicit learning can be found in the learning of conjunctive 
rule-sets (Higham & Brooks, 1997; Neil & Higham, 2012).  To illustrate conjunctive rule-
sets, consider research by Higham and Brooks (1997).  In their Experiment 2, participants 
were given a study list of natural words to learn, all of which conformed to a conjunctive 
rule-set.  For half of the participants, the words on the study list were an equal mixture of 
common verbs (e.g., accept) and rare nouns (e.g., hyacinth), whilst for the other half of 
the participants, the study words were an equal mixture of rare verbs (e.g., inculcate) and 
common nouns (e.g., doctor).  After being informed that there was a rule set but not told 
of its nature, participants were given a test list consisting of all four types of words, some 
of which were old (appeared on both the study list and the test list) and some of which 
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were new (appeared only on the test list).  All old words were necessarily consistent with 
the conjunctive rule-set because of the experimental design, whilst new words consisted 
of both NC (e.g., new, common nouns following a study list of common nouns and rare 
verbs) and NI (e.g., new, common nouns following a list of rare nouns and common 
verbs) words. Participants’ task at test was to classify the test words (‘endorse this word if 
it conforms to the rule set’).  Higham and Brooks (1997) found that participants were 
sensitive to the rule set.  That is, NC words were endorsed more often than NI words, a 
difference they dubbed the structural effect.  Participants were also sensitive to the 
episodic status of the words; that is, old words were endorsed more often than NC words, 
a difference they dubbed the episodic effect.  However, participants were not able to 
accurately verbalize reasons to justify their decisions, suggesting that the knowledge they 
acquired was tacit or implicit. 
Another important facet of these data is that Higham and Brooks (1997) also 
found both structural and episodic effects were detectable under recognition instructions 
as well as classification instructions.  That is, regardless whether participants were told to 
‘endorse this word if it conforms to the rule set’ (classification) or to ‘endorse this word if 
it was on the study list’ (recognition), participants endorsed NC words more than NI 
words (the structural effect), and endorsed old words more than NC words (the episodic 
effect). Thus, regardless of whether endorsing NC words was appropriate to the task 
(classification) or inappropriate to the task (recognition), participants still endorsed NC 
words more than NI words. Consequently, it would seem that the structural effect 
generalizes across different task instructions and can occur even when expressing the 
effect is not desirable.
More recently, Neil and Higham (2012) extended Higham & Brooks’ (1997) 
design to a similar conjunctive rule-set consisting of abstract and concrete words instead 
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of nouns and verbs.  In addition, participants were asked to indicate the basis of their 
individual responses by choosing between intuition, rules, memory, or guess (Dienes & 
Scott, 2005; Scott & Dienes, 2008).  Once the test phase was over, participants were 
asked to select from a list what factors they believed contributed to the rule set.  Like 
Higham & Brooks (1997), their participants were not able to verbalize the rule set and the 
most common response attributions during the test were guess and intuition.  Thus, 
conjunctive rule-set learning creates knowledge that conforms to most popular definitions 
of the term “implicit” (e.g., the knowledge acquired is very hard to describe).  
Additionally, at the end of the test, participants were invited to select from a list as to 
what the rule set might have been, with familiarity being the most commonly selected 
option. This is consistent with several other studies showing that familiarity plays a role in 
the expression of implicit learning (Scott & Dienes, 2008; Tunney, 2007).    
Although there has been a great deal of research into implicit learning (e.g. Nissen 
& Bullemer, 1987; Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1990; Song, Howard, & Howard, 
2007; Tunney, 2010; Van den Bos & Poletiek, 2008; Vokey & Higham, 2005), it is still 
not well understood how implicit learning is affected by the repetition of individual 
exemplars (see below). Thus, using conjunctive rule-set learning, the studies presented in 
this paper will investigate the effect of exemplar repetition on implicit learning.  The next 
section will focus on the existing research on repetition, and the possible effects of 
repetition on the structural effect.
Repetition and Implicit Learning 
Despite the plethora of implicit learning studies, it is surprising that there have 
been very few investigating how implicit learning may be influenced by the repetition of 
individual study exemplars. In some learning tasks, repetition has been shown to provide 
a learning benefit (Wahlheim, Finn, & Jacoby, 2012), whilst presenting a greater number 
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of AG exemplars has been associated with a reduced reliance on bigrams and trigrams 
(Meulemans & Van der Linden, 1997).  However, studies using individual exemplar 
repetition in implicit learning remain scarce.  This may be a function of the paradigms 
used to investigate implicit learning.  Typical AG tasks often repeat individual items at 
study, in that participants are repeatedly shown exemplars until they can reproduce them 
exactly (e.g. Meulemans & Van der Linden, 1997; Reber, 1967), which results in some 
exemplars being repeated whilst others are not.  Serial reaction time tasks similarly utilize 
repetition to help participants learn a probabilistic sequence to criterion (e.g. Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987; Runger & Frensch, 2008).  Thus, many studies repeat their exemplars 
without explicitly measuring the effect of the repetitions. 
One study that did investigate repetition was conducted by Wan, Dienes and Fu 
(2008) who experimentally manipulated repetition of exemplars from two different 
artificial grammars. They found that as long as participants were not instructed to 
strategically endorse the items from the low-repetition grammar, familiarity was higher 
for items from the high-repetition grammar, a result that is consistent with instance 
theory.  However, these results may not generalize to other materials, because the 
particular materials used to demonstrate implicit learning may partly determine the effect 
of exemplar repetition if different materials invoke different underlying processes.  For 
example, memory for surface features of the letter strings has been shown to be an 
important feature of AG learning (e.g. Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; Knowlton & 
Squire, 1994; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). Surface features in this context might be 
individual letters or letter sequences, called chunks (Channon et al., 2002; Dienes et al., 
1991; Jamieson & Mewhort, 2009a; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990), or the extent to which 
letters are repeated in the consonant sequences (e.g. AABBCC rather than ABCDEF, see 
Vokey & Higham, 2005).  Repetition would increase memory for such features, which 
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may, in turn, increase familiarity ratings for grammatical AG strings that share those 
features at test.  Thus, as a general rule, increasing the number of exemplar repetitions 
will also increase learning of chunk regularities, resulting in larger structural effects if AG 
materials are used.  However, Neil and Higham (2012) showed that implicit learning of 
conjunctive rules (at least of the type they were investigating) could not be predicted by 
memory for surface features. Consequently, although repetition improves the learning of 
surface features, it may not benefit participants’ ability to discriminate between NC and 
NI items in the conjunctive-rule learning paradigm investigated by Higham and Brooks 
(1997), Neil and Higham (2012), and in the current research.
Although chunk, or surface feature, learning is unlikely to form the basis of 
sensitivity to conjunctive rules of the type we are investigating, other theories of implicit 
learning can offer clues as to the effect that repetition may have with these materials.  
According to the rule-abstraction theory (Reber, 1967), rules are abstracted by studying 
or observing rule-consistent exemplars, and once abstracted, this knowledge can be 
applied at test to correctly classify new stimuli.  Reber (1989) demonstrated that the 
presentation of additional new exemplars leads to better learning.  By the abstractionist 
account, each exemplar adds to the completeness of the abstraction, such that a complete 
(albeit idiosyncratic) knowledge of the rule set can be gained with exposure to enough 
exemplars.  This would also be true of repetitions of already presented stimuli assuming 
that not all information about a stimulus is encoded on first viewing and that the rule set is 
represented by a wide range of stimuli.  
If the structural effect is supported by rule-abstraction, and the stimuli are varied 
and not perfectly encoded, then we predict that the effect of repetition is straightforward – 
more repetitions leads to more exposure to the rule set and thus a greater chance to 
abstract the rule set, reflected in an increase in the structural effect.  Importantly, the 
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prediction of better learning with exemplar repetition should hold true regardless of 
whether AGs or conjunctive rules are the experimental materials used. 
An alternative account of implicit learning is based on memory for instances rather 
than rule abstraction (Brooks, 1978; Vokey & Brooks, 1992). According to instance 
theory, people do not directly learn the underlying rule set at all. Instead, implicit learning 
effects are based on the way that items are stored in, and retrieved from, memory.  In 
instance theory, each exposure to an exemplar during the study phase creates an 
individual trace (instance or episode) to be stored in memory.  At test, if an exemplar is 
similar to one or more traces in memory, it causes the trace(s) to be retrieved (although 
not necessarily explicitly; see Higham & Vokey, 1994).  This retrieval creates a feeling of 
familiarity, which forms the basis of classification (and recognition) endorsements. Test 
items that are consistent with the rules used to create the study stimuli will be more 
similar, on average, to traces of the study items.  Consequently, NC items have a higher 
familiarity signal than NI items and are therefore more likely to be endorsed. Models such 
as the Retrieving Effectively from Memory model (REM - Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997) and 
the Strength of Activation Model (SAM - Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984), operate according to 
this principle of parallel retrieval of instances and MINERVA (Hintzman, 1984) 
specifically has been shown to simulate implicit learning results quite well (e.g. Jamieson 
& Mewhort, 2009a, 2009b). Chubala, Jones, Jamieson and Mewhort (2016) have even 
applied MINERVA to the conjunctive rule-set used in Neil and Higham (2012), 
demonstrating that models based on instance theory can indeed simulate the empirical 
data.
Regarding repetition effects, in instance models like MINERVA, repetition of 
study items is modelled by multiple traces of each repeated exemplar being stored in 
memory, one for each repetition (Hintzman, 1988).  Thus, any familiarity derived from 
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similarity between a test probe and the study exemplars will be increased proportionate to 
the number of repetitions as long as the encoding and test conditions are held roughly 
constant.  For example, if a particular trace produces one unit of familiarity because it 
shares some features with a test probe, it will produce more than one unit of familiarity if 
the study exemplar is presented three times.  That being the case, one prediction that we 
can make using instance theory is that exemplar repetition will increase the structural 
effect, and the improvement will be dependent on the number of repetitions. 
However, there is some evidence that a different pattern of results may occur. 
Using ATHENA (a modified version of MINERVA), Curtis and Jamieson (2019) 
demonstrated that increasing the study time of stimuli resulted in a large increase in 
recognition performance but only a small increase in classification performance. This 
dissociation was based on task differences (i.e., classification vs recognition) rather than 
effect differences (i.e., structural vs episodic) within tasks as in our case, but the results 
are still relevant to our current predictions. An important feature of ATHENA (as well as 
MINERVA) is non-linear generalizations; that is, a few traces (or even a single trace) in 
memory that are highly similar to a probe contributes disproportionality to classifications 
endorsements compared to multiple, moderately similar traces. Thus, the task dissociation 
in ATHENA occurred because recognition performance was driven by the high similarity 
of the probe to a small number of individual instances in memory, whilst classification 
performance was based on the weak similarity of the probe to a large number of instances 
in memory. Other models have shown similar task dissociations. For example, Kinder and 
Shanks (2001) used a connectionist network called the Simple Recurrent Network (SRN) 
to demonstrate that classification and recognition are differentially sensitive to increases 
in learning efficiency (see also Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, 1992).
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Whilst the results above concerned task dissociations and were simulating learning 
efficiency through manipulations of learning parameters rather than direct manipulations 
of repetition, the logic involved may still offer insight as to what might happen to the 
structural and episodic effects under repetition. It may be that, as with recognition and 
classification tasks, the basis for endorsing old and NC stimuli are slightly different – old 
stimuli may be endorsed because of a strong similarity match to a small number of 
instances in memory, whilst NC stimuli may be endorsed due to a weak match to a large 
number of instance in memory.  If that is the case, then we predict that repetition would 
create additional instances that an old test stimulus could strongly match to, whilst NC 
stimuli would only weakly match to these same additional traces.  Consequently, 
repetition would have a larger effect on the rate of old endorsements than on NC 
endorsements, whereas NI endorsements would remain mostly invariant (because they 
bear little or no similarity to traces in memory). Thus, whilst repetition should increase 
both the episodic and structural effects, the increase in the episodic effect would be larger 
compared to the increase in the structural effect. Critically, however, repetition should 
increase both effects, just at different rates.
Due to the lack of direct empirical evidence about the effects of repetition in the 
implicit learning literature, it is worth considering a related area in which repetition has 
been studied in more detail – category learning.  When learning categories (e.g., species 
of birds), repetition has been shown to provide a learning benefit (Dukes & Bevan, 1967; 
Wahlheim et al., 2012).  Repetition also yields benefits when rating grammatical vs non-
grammatical sentences for grammatical acceptability (Luka & Barsalou, 2005). 
Furthermore, Hintzman (1986) found that repetition improved learning of categories 
represented by exemplars that were distortions of prototypes, an effect that was simulated 
well with MINERVA. 
Page 11 of 78 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021819873838
Running head: REPETITION EFFECTS ON IMPLICIT LEARNING 12
However, unlike most implicit learning experiments, where the existence of a rule 
set is not mentioned to participants until after learning, in most category learning tasks, 
participants are explicitly told at study the categories to which each exemplar belongs (or 
at least are informed that exemplars belong to categories).  Thus category learning tends 
to be explicit – participants explicitly try to learn the rules that map exemplars onto 
categories.  Hintzman (1986) incorporated explicit knowledge of category membership in 
his simulations by coding the exemplar memory traces together with information about 
category membership to reflect this explicit knowledge.  Nonetheless, despite these 
differences, it is still worth noting that the category learning findings as a whole found 
that exemplar repetition improved classification performance, and thus would support the 
prediction that repetition should increase the structural effect.  
Experimental Overview
We report four experiments that are primarily aimed at investigating the effect of 
repetition on the structural effect under different task contexts.  In the experiments, study 
exemplars were presented either once (all experiments) or multiple times (three times in 
Experiments 1 and 2; five times in Experiments 3 and 4). To foreshadow our results, 
reliable structural effects were obtained in all experiments, but no participants could 
accurately verbalize the basis of their responding.  These aspects of the results are similar 
to Higham and Brooks (1997) and Neil and Higham (2012).  More importantly, the 
structural effect was not moderated by exemplar repetition in any experiment. This result 
was not due to an ineffective repetition manipulation: whereas the structural effect 
remained invariant with repetition, the episodic effect – the endorsement advantage that 
old words had over NC words – was greater in both classification and recognition if 
exemplars were repeated than if they were not.  Similarly, confidence ratings (about the 
accuracy of responses) were sensitive to strength.  In Experiments 2, 3 and 4 (with a 
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comparable numerical pattern evident in Experiment 1), participants assigned higher 
confidence ratings to NC items than to NI items, and this difference increased with 
strength. Together, the results indicate a confidence-accuracy dissociation; higher strength 
appears to have no effect on whether or not participants are willing to endorse items, but it 
does affect the confidence associated with those endorsement decisions. 
Experiment 1
The rule used to choose the words for this experiment was the same as that used 
by Neil and Higham (2012). In their study, study lists were constructed such that all the 
items within it conformed to the conjunction of two dimensions: lexical frequency and 
concreteness. In particular, the study list in one condition contained equal numbers of 
common concrete (CC) words such as hotel and rare abstract (RA) words such as tidal.  
The study list in the second condition contained equal numbers of rare concrete (RC) 
words such as kite and common abstract (CA) words such as written.   Following the 
study phase, participants engaged in a two-alternative, forced-choice (2AFC) 
classification task for which each pair consisted of a new word that was of one of the two 
types shown during study for that condition (e.g., either a CC or RA word for condition 1) 
and a new word that was one of the two types shown during study in the other condition 
(e.g., either a RC or CA word for condition 1).  Participants were required to identify the 
one item in each test pair that was consistent with the rule set.  
Neil and Higham (2012) demonstrated that participants were able to discriminate 
new words that were consistent with the rules (i.e., NC words) from those that were 
inconsistent with them (i.e., NI words).  Specifically, after studying items from the first 
condition, the likelihood of endorsing new CC and RA words was higher than that of 
endorsing new RC and CA words for both classification and recognition, but the opposite 
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was true in the second condition.  Furthermore, despite an in-depth questionnaire, 
participants were unable to verbalize the rules or even choose with any regularity the 
correct dimensions used to create the conjunctive rule (i.e., concreteness or lexical 
frequency).  One advantage of this design is that surface features of the specific stimuli 
were controlled because rule-consistent words from one rule set acted as rule-inconsistent 
words for the other rule set. Thus, learning of sequences of letters was not sufficient to 
learn enough about the rule-set to create the structural effect. Instead, the rule-set was 
instantiated in a conceptual linking of characteristics of the words related to meaning and 
usage. 
The primary purpose of Experiment 1 was to determine how repetition of the 
study stimuli affected the relative size of the episodic and structural effects.  To achieve 
this end, we adopted Neil and Higham’s (2012) design, but incorporated several changes.  
First, we included old items in the test list along with the NC and NI words. Second, 
single items were presented for a yes/no decision instead of item pairs presented for a 
2AFC decision.  Finally, a recognition task as well as a classification task was included to 
test for the generality of repetition effects.
These changes to the design allowed us to use methodology adopted from signal 
detection theory to analyze the results. In particular, we assumed that for both recognition 
and classification there were three normal distributions on a strength-of-evidence 
dimension corresponding to old items, NC items, and NI items (Figure 1).  Participants 
made either a classification or recognition judgment by adopting a yes/no criterion 
somewhere on the strength-of-evidence dimension.  The standardized difference between 
the means of the old and NC distributions corresponded to the episodic effect (d’e), 
whereas the standardized difference between the means of the NC and NI distributions 
corresponded to the structural effect (d’s).  
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--- Insert Figure 1 about here ---
We predicted that with repetition, the old distribution would gain in strength, 
increasing the episodic effect.  However, this increase would be offset to some degree 
because the NC distribution, by virtue of its items sharing features with studied items, 
would also gain strength from repetitions, albeit not as much as old items.  The increase to 
the NC distribution would mean that the structural effect would also increase with 
repetition of the study items.
For both the recognition and classification tasks, we also asked participants to rate 
their confidence in the accuracy of their decisions.  Confidence ratings were collected so 
performance could be assessed against the zero-correlation criterion (Dienes, Altmann, 
Kwan, & Goode, 1995).  According to this criterion, if participants’ performance and 
confidence ratings are unrelated then they can be said to be unaware of the basis of their 
performance.  Also, participants were asked to indicate for each item whether their 
decision was based on random chance1, intuition, memory (for prior study items), or 
(knowledge of the) rules (Dienes & Scott, 2005; Higham, Bruno, & Perfect, 2010). These 
metacognitive knowledge states were assessed to obtain a clearer picture of the bases of 
participants’ recognition and classification decisions. Finally, post-experiment 
questionnaires were used to directly probe for verbalizable knowledge of the rule set.   
Method
Participants.  Forty-two undergraduates from the University of Southampton 
participated in the experiment for either course credits or £5 payment. 
Materials and design.  Forty words from four different categories were randomly 
drawn from the MRC psycholinguistic database to create two study lists (Wilson, 1988).  
The categories were CC words (e.g. hotel), RA words (e.g. tidal), RC words (e.g. kite) 
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and CA words (e.g. written).  Common words occurred at a frequency of 80+ per million 
and rare words occurred at a frequency of 1 or less per million by Kucera-Francis written-
frequency norms (Kucera & Francis, 1967).  Concrete words were rated as 520 or more 
by the MRC concreteness rating (Coltheart, 1981).  Due to a shortage of words with low 
concreteness ratings, abstract words were identified by the experimenter from the set of 
unrated words in the database.  Study List A consisted of 40 CC and 40 RA words 
whereas Study List B consisted of the 40 RC and 40 CA words.  Thus, each study list 
consisted of 80 unique items.
During the study phase, participants rated each word on a study list for 
understanding.  Strength was manipulated between participants, with each word being 
presented once in the weak condition and three times in the strong condition.  The study 
list used (A or B) was counterbalanced across participants.  The presentation order of the 
words was randomized anew for each participant, with the restriction that all words on a 
study list had to be seen once before any word could be repeated, with the word order 
being randomized anew for each repetition cycle. Items were also restricted from 
appearing twice in a row.
Each participant completed two test phases.  Two test lists (one for each test 
phase) were created by randomly drawing 20 new words (not on the study lists) from each 
category (CC, RC, CA and RA) for each list from the MRC database.  Thus, each test list 
contained 40 NC and 40 NI words, with NC words for Study List A being NI words Study 
List B, and vice versa.  In addition to the new words, words were randomly assigned to 
two sets of 40 old words (20 from each studied category) and one set was added to each 
test list. Thus, each studied word served as an old item in one of the test lists.  Thus 120 
words were presented in each test phase: 40 old words, 40 NC words and 40 NI words.  
The new words were the same for every participant (although each new word served 
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equally often across participants as either NC or NI), but the 40 old words were from one 
of two sets depending on which study list a participant had seen.  As there were two test 
phases, by the end of the experiment each participant saw all 80 old words from their 
study phase.  Once created, each test list was not changed, with presentation order of the 
words being random, with each test list serving equally in each test phase.
All participants completed two tasks, one for each test phase.  Recognition and 
classification involved participants making old/new judgments and consistent/inconsistent 
judgments, respectively, to individually presented words.  For each individual trial, 
participants were asked to give confidence ratings and to provide a judgment about the 
basis of their decisions (see Procedure for details).  Task order was counterbalanced 
across participants.  
Following Neil & Higham (2012), a questionnaire was used to assess verbalizable 
knowledge of the rule set. The questionnaire did not vary by condition. It consisted of five 
questions, with early questions being vague (e.g., participants were asked to provide a 
free-form response regarding what they thought the rules were) and later questions getting 
increasingly direct (e.g., participants were told that the rule was conjunctive and given a 
list of possible rules from which they were asked to pick two).  
To summarize, the design of Experiment 1 consisted of a between-subject 
manipulation of strength (weak/strong) and within-subject manipulations of task type 
(classification/recognition) and word type (old/NC/NI), with the study list used, task order 
and test list order counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure.  This and all other experiments in the paper were given ethical 
approval by the University of Southampton ethics panel. Participants provided written 
consent before proceeding with the study. In the study phase, participants were shown one 
of the two study lists on a computer screen, one word at a time.  Each word was displayed 
Page 17 of 78 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021819873838
Running head: REPETITION EFFECTS ON IMPLICIT LEARNING 18
in the center of the screen for 1.5 seconds.  Presentation order of the words was 
randomized separately for each participant.  Participants’ attention during study was 
ensured by having them rate each word for how well they understood its meaning on a 
scale of one to four (1= did not understand at all; 4=fully understand).  These data were 
not analyzed and will not be discussed further. In the weak condition each word was 
displayed once (80 total presentations) whereas in the strong condition, each word was 
displayed three times (240 total presentations).  Participants were not told about the rule 
set at this stage.
After the study phase, participants were told that the words at study conformed to 
a complex rule set, but they were not told of its nature.  They were then given the two test 
phases on a computer. In the recognition task, participants judged each word as either old 
(seen before) or new (not seen before) by clicking one of two radio buttons under the 
word.  They also typed in a confidence rating on a scale of 50-100 and selected the basis 
of their decision from a choice of random chance (“choose this when you have no 
preference for one response over the other.  In other words you are just choosing a 
random response - you may as well be flipping a coin”), intuition (“choose this when you 
feel as if you can't put your finger on why you think your response is correct but you are 
fairly sure you are in fact correct.  In other words you are using instinct or a gut 
response.”), memory (“this is when you have become consciously aware of some aspect or 
aspects of what happened or what was experienced in the first phase”) and rules (“choose 
this when your answer is based on a rule or rule set that you would be able to describe if 
asked”), using a radio button.  The test was self-paced.  All judgments were present on the 
computer screen simultaneously and participants initiated the next trial by clicking a 
button with the mouse.  If any of the judgments were missing participants were asked to 
enter all remaining information before continuing.  The classification task was the same as 
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the recognition task except that participants judged if words were consistent with the 
study phase rule-set instead of the old/new decision.  All participants took both 
recognition and classification tests.
Once both test phases had been completed a computer-based questionnaire was 
administered in order to probe for understanding of the rule set.  The questions were 
administered one at a time and participants responded using free text boxes and radio 
buttons. Participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
For both recognition and classification, there were endorsement rates associated 
with old words, NC words, and NI words - see Table 1.  Two types of discrimination were 
calculated – d’e and d’s, where the subscripts e and s refer to the episodic and structural 
effects, respectively.2  The d’e measure represented the ability of participants to 
discriminate between old and NC items and reflects the contribution of remembering 
specific words from study over and above that of the influence of the study rule set.  The 
second measure, d’s, represented the ability of participants to discriminate between NC 
and NI words and reflects the contribution of the rule set without the influence of 
veridical episodic memory for the items.  Endorsement rates are presented as proportions, 
although proportions of zero or one were corrected as recommended by Macmillan and 
Creelman (2005) by replacing rates of 1 with 1 - (1/2n) and rates of 0 with 1/2n where n 
was the total number of possible endorsements (n = 40 for most of the analyses).  This 
correction was applied 22 times across all participants, conditions, and tasks, most 
frequently on old endorsement rates that were at ceiling.  
There were no interactions involving test list order or study list used so these 
variables will not be addressed further. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical 
tests.
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--- Insert Table 1 about here ---
Structural and episodic discrimination.  The endorsement rates in classification 
and recognition are shown in Table 1, whilst the d’ measures are shown in Table 2.  In 
addition to comparisons between the experimental conditions, the d’ measures were 
compared against zero (chance performance) using the 95% confidence interval.  These 
tests indicated that all d’s were significantly above zero (see Table 2).
--- Insert Table 2 about here ---
The d’ measures were subjected to a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with within-
subjects variables of task type (recognition/classification) and discrimination type 
(episodic/structural) and a between-subject variable of strength (weak/strong).  Better 
overall discrimination was found in recognition (M = 1.43, SE = .06) than classification 
(M = 1.17, SE =.06), F(1, 41) = 13.28, p = .001, η2 = .25 and in the strong condition (M = 
1.41, SE = .07) compared to the weak condition (M = 1.19, SE = .07), F(1, 41) = 4.99, p = 
.03, η2=.11.  In addition, d’e was greater than d’s, F(1, 41) = 413.16, p < .001, η2 =.91.
More importantly, an interaction between strength and discrimination type, F(1, 
41) = 4.09, p = .05, η2= .09, indicated that d’e increased from weak to strong conditions, 
F(1, 41) = 5.80, p = .02, η2 = .13, whereas d’s did not, F < 1.  There was also an 
interaction between task type and discrimination type, F(1, 41) = 8.53, p = .006, η2 = .18 
which indicated that d’e decreased from recognition to classification F(1, 41) = 13.67, p = 
.001, η2 = .25 whilst d’s did not change by task, F < 1.  See Table 2 for means and 
standard errors.  There were no other significant effects, largest F < 1.  
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Awareness measures.  The questionnaire indicated that no participant developed 
knowledge of the rule set.  Even when directly told that the rule was a conjunctive rule, no 
participant accurately described the actual rule set.  When forced to pick two items from a 
list of possible factors involved in the rule set, only one participant selected both 
frequency and concreteness, and the description he or she offered for how the two items 
were linked was incorrect.  The most commonly selected individual items were familiarity 
and frequency (see Table 3).  These results are analogous to those found by Neil and 
Higham (2012).
--- Insert Table 3 about here ---
Awareness was also tested with the zero-correlation criterion using Chan’s 
Difference Score (CDS: Dienes et al., 1995).  CDS is calculated by subtracting mean 
confidence assigned to endorsed NI items from mean confidence assigned to endorsed NC 
items.  If confidence for NC items is higher than that assigned to NI items, then CDS is 
larger than zero and explicit awareness is implicated.  In particular, judgment knowledge 
(i.e., knowledge regarding whether or not an item has structure) is assumed to be 
conscious (Scott & Dienes, 2005).  CDS scores were computed separately for 
classification and recognition and could range from 0 to 50 in either task.3  These CDS 
scores were compared against zero using 95% confidence intervals (see Table 4).  The 
CDS scores were significantly above zero in all conditions except for the weak condition 
in the classification task.  Variation in the CDS was investigated using a 2 x 2 mixed 
ANOVA with a within-subjects variable of task type (recognition/classification) and a 
between-subject variable of strength (weak/strong).  There were no effects, highest F(1, 
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30) = 1.45, p = .24.4  However, it is worth noting that there was a numerical increase in 
the size of CDS as strength was increased, a point to which we return below. 
--- Insert Table 4 about here ---
Finally, the distribution of participants’ attributions to random chance, intuition, 
memory and rules, was examined to discover if the structural effect was limited to 
particular attributions or distributed more evenly.  The endorsement rates were split by 
attribution type, and the difference between the endorsement rate for NC and NI items 
was calculated.  This produced a difference score that indicated the amount of the 
structural effect that was attributed to the various attribution types (see Table 5).  These 
difference scores were compared against zero (chance performance) using the 95% 
confidence interval. As shown in Table 5, the structural effect was attributed primarily to 
intuition and memory in both recognition and classification, with very little effect 
attributed to random chance or rules. 
--- Insert Table 5 about here ---
Discussion
Consistent with previous results (Higham & Brooks, 1997; Neil & Higham, 2012), 
there was evidence in Experiment 1 of both a structural and an episodic effect in under 
classification instructions.  The same was true under recognition instructions.  There was, 
however, a dissociation between the episodic effect and the structural effect, as the 
increase in strength resulted in a greater increase in performance for the episodic effect 
than the structural effect.  This finding is consistent with the extant theories and data.  
Were the task to be performed on the basis of rule-abstraction (e.g. Reber, 1967), then 
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responses to NC items would primarily be driven by the extent to which rule-abstraction 
was successful. Responding to old items would be supported by rule-abstraction plus the 
contribution of explicit memory for the old items, resulting in the old items having a 
greater sensitivity to strength than the NC items. If learning were based only on surface 
features, then the old stimuli are likely to contain more matching surface features than the 
NC items, again making the episodic effect increase more with strength than the structural 
effect. Instance-based models such as MINERVA and ATHENA (Curtis & Jamieson, 
2019) can also explain the dissociation between the episodic and structural effects. As 
noted in the introduction, for old items responding is driven by the high similarity of the 
probe to a small number of individual instances in memory, whilst for NC items 
responding is driven by the weak similarity of the probe to a large number of instances in 
memory, and the former is more sensitive to strength manipulations than the latter. SRN 
(Kinder & Shanks, 2001) similarly suggests that the episodic and structural effects will be 
differentially sensitive to the strength manipulation.
More importantly, the structural effect did not increase with strength at all. This 
lack of increase was at odds with our predications derived from all of the theories 
mentioned above. Theories based on memory for surface features (e.g. Channon et al., 
2002; Vokey & Higham, 2005) or rule abstraction (e.g. Reber, 1967), hold that the 
structural effect should have increased with exemplar repetition as long as test probes 
were, on average, more similar to NC than NI items.5  Whilst instance-based models 
suggest that the episodic and structural effects would be dissociated in their sensitivity to 
strength, repetition should still increase the structural effect, if only by a small amount. If 
this were happening, we should see at least a descriptive increase in the structural effect 
by strength, whereas descriptively the structural effect was actually higher in the weak 
condition in the strong condition, at least for in the recognition task. Of course, there may 
Page 23 of 78 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021819873838
Running head: REPETITION EFFECTS ON IMPLICIT LEARNING 24
be a small increase in the structural effect that we did not detect due to a lack of statistical 
power. We will return to this point later, after Experiment 4. That said,  in our view, our 
finding of a static structural effect in the face of variable exemplar repetitions is 
something that any theory of implicit learning needs to be able to explain.
In terms of awareness measures, Neil and Higham (2012) found that participants 
were likely to experience the structural effect as familiarity, a finding that was replicated 
in Experiment 1.  Wan et al. (2008) suggested that participants can make strategic 
decisions about how they use familiarity.  However, the presence of a structural effect in 
both classification and recognition suggests that no such strategic control was exercised 
by our participants in Experiment 1.  In the classification task, a structural effect is clearly 
desirable (i.e., ideal performance would be NC=1; NI=0).  Thus in the classification 
condition, participants should strategically use familiarity to endorse NC items and reject 
NI items, perhaps by endorsing all items with high familiarity.  Conversely in the 
recognition condition, no structural effect at all is desirable (i.e., ideal performance would 
be NC=NI=0).  To achieve this, participants would need to strategically use familiarity to 
reject both NC and NI items, perhaps by requiring a higher level of familiarity to endorse 
items compared to classification.  Clearly participants have not successfully exercised 
such strategic choices, instead endorsing items in such a way as to produce an equal 
structural effect in both classification and recognition.  Although Wan et al. have 
demonstrated that participants can strategically use familiarity, our results suggest that 
there is some element of familiarity that cannot be strategically controlled, or else that 
some tasks result in participants making sub-optimal choices about their use of 
familiarity.
The evidence from the post-experimental questionnaire suggested that no 
participant gained verbalizable knowledge of the rule set.  Even those participants who 
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selected the rules attribution were unable to accurately describe the rule set on the 
questionnaire.  In contrast, the CDS analysis suggested that confidence in NC items was 
greater than NI items. Thus, on some level, participants’ subjective experience with NC 
items was different from that with NI items, which was reflected in their confidence 
judgments (i.e., the zero-correlation criterion was not met; Dienes et al., 1995). One 
possible reason for this difference between awareness measures is that participants, at 
least in part, included the higher familiarity of NC items compared to NI items as a basis 
for their confidence judgments.  Nonetheless, while the post-experimental questionnaire 
results indicate no explicit awareness of the structural effect, the CDS analysis suggests 
that participants’ subjective confidence was sensitive to the structural manipulation, 
which is a form of awareness in its own right.  Although not statistically significant, Table 
4 suggests that strength may have descriptively increased CDS despite it having no effect 
on the item endorsement rates that underpinned the structural effect.  We return to this 
point below. 
The structural effect was distributed primarily across intuition and memory 
attribution types. If it is accepted that intuition and memory attributions represent 
unconscious and conscious structural knowledge, respectively (e.g., see Dienes & Scott, 
2005), then the attribution data suggest both types of knowledge were present in 
Experiment 1.  One potential reason that no structural effect was observed on rules 
attributions was that rules was the least popular attribution choice, particularly in 
recognition (see supplementary material).  Nonetheless, the attribution results clearly 
indicate that the structural effect was not attributed to a single attribution type. 
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Experiment 2
Although Experiment 1 was successful in demonstrating that repetition has 
dissociative effects on the episodic versus structural effects in both recognition and 
classification, we conducted a second experiment with more challenging learning 
conditions.  In particular, we shortened the display duration of the words during study.  
The reason for this change was that the endorsement rates of old items in both tasks in 
Experiment 1 were close to ceiling.  The ceiling old endorsement rates necessitated 
applying a correction factor to multiple cells in the design to avoid undefined d’ values, 
which could have potentially produced spurious results. 
Second, participants in Experiment 1 were able to pause after reading each word 
during study whilst they made their understanding rating.  This aspect of the procedure 
potentially allowed participants to rehearse each word such that the words were more or 
less perfectly encoded on first viewing.  Under such circumstances, repeating the same 
exemplars may not have resulted in better learning. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we 
addressed this issue by removing the requirement for ratings during study.
One further change was implemented in Experiment 2 in an attempt to both 
remove potential confounding variables and to reduce the demands on participants.  To 
avoid potential carry-over effects caused by requiring participants to engage in two test 
tasks, we manipulated task type between subjects in Experiment 2.  This change was 
made because we reasoned that there might have been an influence of repetition on the 
structural effect in Experiment 1 that was masked by complexities introduced by requiring 
participants to perform both recognition and classification in different test blocks, and that 
a simpler design may allow such an influence to be revealed.  
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Method
Participants.  Sixty-four undergraduates from the University of Southampton 
participated in the experiment for either course credits or £5 payment.
Materials and design.  The materials and general design were the same as in 
Experiment 1.
Procedure.  The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, except for the following 
changes. To address the ceiling effect for old-word endorsements, words in the study 
phase were displayed for 1 second each rather than 1.5 seconds (as in Experiment 1) and 
participants did not have to rate the words for understanding.  Thus, whereas Experiment 
1’s study phase allowed participants to rehearse each word before making their 
understanding rating, Experiment 2 allowed no such rehearsal time.  Finally, only a single 
test block was administered to avoid any between-block carry-over effects.  Thus, task 
type was a between- rather than a within-subjects variable in Experiment 2.
Results
Endorsement rates were calculated as in Experiment 1.  As shown in Table 6, 
making the learning conditions more challenging in this experiment had the desired effect 
of reducing old-item endorsement rates that were near ceiling in Experiment 1.  In fact, no 
corrections to the hit rate were required in this experiment (i.e., the old-item endorsement 
rate was never equal to one for any participant).
Eight participants were excluded from the analyses reported below – seven due to 
distractions from mobile phones occurring in the learning phase or guessing on every trial 
and one for very low recognition performance (more than three standard deviations below 
the mean).
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--- Insert Table 6 about here ---
Structural and episodic discrimination.  The d’e and d’s measures were again 
computed from the endorsement rates – see Table 6 for endorsement rates and Table 7 for 
d’ measures.  As in Experiment 1, the d’s were both compared against chance using 
confidence intervals (see Table 7) and the differences in the magnitude of the d’ measures 
were investigated with a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with task type, strength (both between 
subjects) and effect type (within subjects).6 
--- Insert Table 7 about here ---
As in Experiment 1, the ANOVA revealed that d’e (M = 1.14, SE = .06) was 
higher than d’s (M = .24, SE = .04), F(1, 52) = 131.86, p < .001, η2 = .72.  There was also 
better discrimination in the strong (M = .81, SE = .05) compared to the weak condition (M 
= .57, SE = .05), F(1, 52) = 14.04, p < .001, η2 = .90, and in recognition (M = .81, SE = 
.04) compared to classification (M = .57, SE = .05), F(1, 52) = 13.16, p < .001, η2 = .20.
Critically, there was an effect-type by study-strength interaction, F(1, 52) = 8.51, p 
= .005, η2 = .14.  Just as in Experiment 1, the interaction indicated an effect of strength on 
d’e, F(1, 52) = 17.07, p < .001, η2 = .25, but no change in d’s, F < 1.  There were no other 
significant effects from the ANOVA, largest F < 1.
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Awareness measures.  As in Experiment 1, the questionnaire data once again 
indicated that no participant developed explicit knowledge of the rule set.  Only one 
participant selected the correct dimensions on the last question, but failed to describe the 
correct link between them.  Contrary to Experiment 1, the most popular choices were 
category (noun/verb) and association (Table 3).  
CDS was computed from the confidence data and compared against zero, as in 
Experiment 1 (Table 8).  Only in the strong condition in the recognition task was the CDS 
different from zero, again indicating higher confidence for NC endorsements that NI 
endorsements.  Variations in the CDS scores were analyzed with a 2 (task type: 
recognition/classification) x 2 (strength: strong, weak) mixed ANOVA.  There was only a 
main effect of strength, F(1, 52) = 4.78, p <.03, η2 = .08, indicating higher CDS scores in 
the strong condition compared to the weak condition.  There were no other significant 
effects, highest F(1, 52) = 2.09, p = 0.15,  η2 =0.04.
--- Insert Table 8 about here ---
As in Experiment 1, the difference scores between NC and NI endorsements were 
calculated for each attribution type (random chance, intuition, memory and rules), and 
compared against zero (see Table 9). Unlike Experiment 1, there was some evidence in 
classification that participants attributed the structural effect of rules instead of intuition 
and memory. However, intuition was the attribution source of the structural effect in 
recognition.  Generally speaking, the attribution data indicate that there was both 
conscious and unconscious structural knowledge in Experiment 2, and that no one 
particular attribution was the source of the structural effect in either task.  
--- Insert Table 9 about here ---
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Discussion
As in Experiment 1, participants were sensitive to the episodic status of the items, 
and that sensitivity increased with strength.  The strength effect was observed despite the 
poorer learning conditions in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1 (i.e., old 
endorsement rates such that they were no longer at ceiling).  This effect suggests that the 
strength influence on the episodic effect is robust. More importantly, although a structural 
effect was observed in Experiment 2, it was not moderated by strength in either 
recognition or classification, replicating the results of Experiment 1.
As in Experiment 1, the questionnaire indicated that participants had no 
verbalizable knowledge of the rule set.  However, unlike Experiment 1, the criteria that 
participants identified most commonly were category (noun/verb) and association. 
Familiarity was not a favored criterion, perhaps because the difficult learning conditions 
in Experiment 2 made any criterion to do specifically with memory influences less 
attractive.
Although the endorsement rates underpinning the structural effect were unaffected 
by strength, the strength manipulation reliably increased CDS.  This result replicates a 
similar trend observed in Experiment 1.  Thus, the results of Experiment 2 demonstrate 
that although strength does not moderate participants’ tendency to endorse NC items 
more than NI items, it does moderate their confidence in those endorsements.  Stated 
differently, exemplar repetition does not boost the structural effect in terms of 
endorsement rates, but it does alter the subjective confidence associated with those 
endorsements. As in Experiment 1, the fact that CDS was above zero (at least in the 
strong-recognition condition) and sensitive to strength suggests that the structural effect 
has an explicit component (Dienes & Scott, 2005), contrary to the post-experimental 
questionnaire results.  
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As in Experiment 1, the structural effect was spread across the different attribution 
sources (random chance, intuition, memory, and rules) rather than being associated with 
only one type. However, it is interesting to note that there was above-chance performance 
when participants said rules in classification, but there was no evidence that participants 
could actually verbalize the rule set used.  Similar to Experiment 1, the fact that 
attributions were made to intuition on the one hand versus rules on the other, suggests that 
there was, respectively, both unconscious and conscious structural knowledge in 
Experiment 2.
Experiment 3
Both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated a dissociative influence of repetition on 
the episodic versus structural effects.  Whereas the episodic effect increased dramatically 
with repetition of the rule-set exemplars during study, the structural effect remained 
invariant.
The general learning conditions were excellent in Experiment 1, which produced 
near ceiling endorsement rates for old items.  This problem was alleviated in Experiment 
2 by making the learning conditions more challenging.  However, a separate issue pertains 
to the robustness of the strength manipulation.  In both Experiments 1 and 2, strength was 
manipulated by presenting exemplars either once or thrice.  Perhaps the structural effect 
was not sensitive to strength in those experiments because the strength manipulation was 
too weak.  Conceivably, both the episodic and structural effects might be boosted with a 
more extreme manipulation of strength. To address this possibility, we used five 
presentations rather than three in the strong condition of Experiment 3.  
A second possible issue with the strength manipulation is that the presence of 
strengthened items in the test list may have made the list as a whole seem more 
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memorable, resulting in some participants requiring a lot of evidence before responding 
“old” (recognition) or “consistent” (classification) during the test phase (i.e., a 
conservative responding strategy might have been adopted).  However, if only some 
participants explicitly noticed the strength manipulation, then not all participants may 
have had the opportunity to adjust their decision criterion accordingly.  To ensure that 
there were no such participant differences (which could have introduced noise and 
masked the moderating influence of strength on the structural effect), we made the 
strength manipulation in Experiment 3 more explicit by informing participants that they 
would see words during study either once or multiple times.
Method
Participants.  Sixty-four undergraduates from the University of Southampton 
participated in the experiment either for course credits or £5 payment.
Materials and design.  The materials and counterbalancing were the same as in 
Experiment 2, except for two stimuli that were replaced due to them sharing word 
fragments (e.g., earth and earthworm)7.  The general design was also the same as 
Experiment 2 except for the following changes.  To make the strength manipulation more 
noticeable, participants were warned, before the study phase began, about how many 
times each word would be presented.  Additionally, words in the strong condition were 
displayed five times each (instead of three as in Experiments 1 and 2).  A retention 
interval was also added between the study and test phases such that the time between the 
start of the study phase and the start of the test phase was ten minutes for every 
participant, regardless of the strength condition.  During the retention interval, participants 
solved simple arithmetic problems in which a sum was presented with some digits 
missing (i.e. 45 + ?? = 59).  Participants were asked to write down the missing digits. 
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Note that this design feature meant that participants in the weak condition had a longer 
interval between seeing the last study word and the beginning of the test phase than did 
participants in the strong condition.
Procedure.  The procedure was identical to Experiment 2, except for two aspects.  
The instructions were changed to inform participants how many times they would see 
each word during the study phase.  Also, the retention interval described above was 
added. 
Results
Mean endorsement rates in classification and recognition were calculated and 
corrected as previously (six corrections were applied) and are shown in Table 10.  One 
participant was excluded from the analysis for low recognition performance (more than 
three standard deviations below the mean).
--- Insert Table 10 about here ---
Structural and episodic discrimination.  The mean d’e and d’s measures in 
classification and recognition were again computed from the endorsement rates for each 
participant, see Table 11.  Mean d’s were then compared to chance using confidence 
intervals and differences in magnitude of the d’ measures were investigated with a 2 x 2 x 
2 ANOVA with between subject variables of task type and strength and a within-subject 
variable of effect type. 
--- Insert Table 11 about here ---
The ANOVA again revealed that there was a higher d’e (M = 1.29, SE = 0.11) than 
d’s (M = 0.32, SE = 0.04), F(1, 59) = 73.66, p = .001, η2 = .55 and there was overall better 
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discrimination in the strong (M = 1.08, SE = 0.07) than the weak (M = 0.53, SE = 0.07) 
condition, F(1, 59) = 38.54, p < .001, η2 = .85.  Critically, as in Experiments 1 and 2, there 
was an interaction between effect type and strength, F(1, 59) = 41.11, p < .001, η2 = .29.  
As previously, the interaction reflected a greater d’e in the strong than in the weak 
condition, F(1, 59) = 38.45, p < .001, η2 = .39, whilst the d’s did not change, F < 1 (Table 
11).  There were no other significant effects, highest F(1, 59) = 1.07, p = .30.
Awareness questionnaire. Once again the questionnaire indicated that no 
participants developed explicit knowledge of the rule set.  No participant guessed the two 
correct criteria, with the most popular selections being association, frequency, and 
meaning (Table 3).  Thus, unlike Experiment 1, but similar to Experiment 2, familiarity 
was not the favorite criterion amongst participants.  
CDSs were analyzed as in the previous experiments (see Table 12).  For both 
tasks, the CDS scores in the strong condition were significantly above zero whilst the 
CDS scores in the weak condition were not.  As in Experiment 2, a 2 (task type: 
recognition/classification) x 2 (strength: strong, weak) mixed ANOVA indicated only a 
main effect of strength, F(1, 59) = 5.85, p =.02, η2 = .09, reflecting higher CDS scores in 
the strong condition than in the weak condition.  
--- Insert Table 12 about here ---
The difference scores between NC and NI endorsements for each attribution type 
(random chance, rules, memory, and intuition) were also analyzed (see Table 13).  As in 
previous experiments, there was no evidence that one particular attribution was the source 
of the structural effect. Instead, memory, intuition and rules all played a part.  Thus, as in 
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the previous experiments, there was evidence of both conscious (memory, rules) and 
unconscious (intuition) structural knowledge in this experiment.
--- Insert Table 13 about here ---
Discussion
As in the previous two experiments, repetition increased the episodic effect, but 
had no effect on the structural effect.  This occurred despite the fact that the repetition 
manipulation was boosted from 1 vs. 3 repetitions in Experiments 1 and 2 to 1 vs. 5 in 
Experiment 3.  Consequently, there is no evidence that the dissociation observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 was due to a weak strength manipulation.  Instead, it appears that the 
structural effect, unlike the episodic effect, is insensitive to strength under a variety of 
experimental conditions.
As in the previous experiments, the questionnaire data indicated that participants 
did not acquire verbalizable knowledge of the rules.  This was true despite presenting 
participants, toward the end of the questionnaire, with the exact categories that made up 
the conjunctive rule set.  Unlike Experiment 1, familiarity was not participants’ favorite 
criterion, just as it was not in Experiment 2. The d’ data suggest that the learning 
conditions in Experiment 3 were similar to Experiment 2 and not as favorable as they 
were in Experiment 1 (cf. Tables 2, 7 and 11). These poorer conditions in the latter two 
experiments may have dissuaded participants from selecting familiarity as their judgment 
criterion, as familiarity is a memory-based attribution and memory for the items would 
play a less significant role with poorer learning conditions. 
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In contrast to the endorsement data, the confidence data indicated that the CDS 
increased with exemplar repetition in both tasks, which meant that they were above 
chance in the strong condition, but not the weak condition.  In the strong condition (but 
less so in the weak condition) participants endorsed NC words with higher confidence 
than NI words, regardless of whether it was appropriate (classification) or inappropriate 
(recognition) to do so. Thus, whereas the endorsement rates underpinning the structural 
effect in both classification and recognition were unaffected by strength, there was 
evidence that subjective confidence responded to the strength manipulation. However, our 
post-experimental questionnaire results suggest that any changes to subjective confidence 
arising from strength did not translate into verbalizable knowledge.  
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the structural effect was distributed across the different 
attribution types rather than being limited to one attribution in particular.  Even though 
there was again some evidence of a structural effect when participants selected the rules 
attribution, participants were not able to verbalize what this rule set might have been.  
Experiment 4
Across Experiments 1-3, strength did not increase the structural effect. One 
possible explanation for this result is that, as additional exemplars leads to better learning 
(Reber, 1989), 80 exemplars is enough for participants to extract all possible information 
about the ruleset. Consequently, additional presentations of the same exemplars provided 
no learning benefit. Thus, to address this issue, Experiment 4 introduced a condition with 
5 exemplars per ruleset, for a total of 10 exemplars at study. If in the previous experiment 
participants had simply reached the limit of their learning, then at such a low number of 
exemplars, strength may begin to induce an increase in the structural effect  
Method
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Participants.  One hundred and sixty-two undergraduates from the University of 
Southampton participated in the experiment either for course credits or £5 payment.
Materials and design.  The materials and counterbalancing were the same as in 
Experiment 3.  The general design was also the same as Experiment 3 except for an 
additional variable. As well as study strength, variety at study was also manipulated, 
between participants. The study phase contained either 80 unique words (as in Experiment 
3) or 10 unique words. In addition, in order to focus on the structural effect, only a 
classification task was used, and old words were not displayed at test. Thus, the test words 
were all NC or NI, and all participants took part in the classification task. 
Procedure.  The procedure was identical to Experiment 3, other than the 
additional condition noted above, and the lack of a recognition task.
Results
Mean endorsement rates are shown in Table 14. It was not necessary to correct 
any rates of 0 or 1. 
--- Insert Table 14 about here ---
Structural and episodic discrimination.  The mean d’s were again computed 
from the endorsement rates for each participant and are shown in Table 15. Mean d’s were 
then compared to chance using confidence intervals and differences in magnitude of the 
d’ measures were investigated with a 2 x 2 ANOVA with between-subject variables of 
variety and strength.
--- Insert Table 15 about here ---
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For both the weak and strong conditions, all d’s were above chance - see Table 15. 
The ANOVA revealed only an effect of variety - d’s was higher in the 80 word condition 
than the 10 word condition, F(1, 158) = 4.00, p = .047, η2 = .025. There were no other 
effects, highest F(1, 158) = 1.44, p = 0.23. 
Awareness questionnaire. Once again the questionnaire indicated that no 
participants developed explicit knowledge of the rule set.  No participant guessed the two 
correct criteria, with the most popular selections being association, category, and meaning 
(Table 3).  Thus, as in Experiments 2 and 3, familiarity was not the favorite criterion 
amongst participants.  
CDS measures were analyzed as in the previous experiments (see Table 16).  For 
both tasks, the CDS scores in the strong condition were significantly above zero whilst the 
CDS scores in the weak condition were not.  Changes in the CDS measures were analyzed 
using a 2 (variety: 10 words/80 words) x 2 (strength: strong, weak) ANOVA. There was 
only a main effect of strength, F(1, 158) = 10.98, p =.001, η2 = .06, reflecting higher CDS 
scores in the strong condition than in the weak condition.  There were no other effects, 
highest F < 1.
--- Insert Table 16 about here ---
As in the previous experiments, the difference scores between NC and NI 
endorsements were calculated for each attribution type, and compared against zero (see 
Table 17). Across the various conditions, random chance, memory and rules were all 
implicated. Once again, there seemed to be both conscious and unconscious structural 
knowledge, with no one attribution being dominant.   
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--- Insert Table 17 about here ---
Discussion
With both 10 and 80 exemplars at study, the results of Experiment 4 were similar 
to Experiment 3. The structural effect did not increase with strength, but CDS ratings did. 
However, the structural effect did increase with the number of exemplars used, with the 
structural effect being greater in the 80 words condition than in the 10 words condition.  
Thus, it would seem that the lack of increase in the structural effect with strength was not 
due to the structural effect being at ceiling, otherwise it should have increased with 
strength in the 10 word condition.  Whilst this result supports the finding of Reber (1989), 
it is also similar to work in the category learning literature, in which increased exemplar 
variety also leads to increased performance (Dukes & Bevan, 1967; Homa, Sterling, & 
Trepel, 1981). Regardless, it seems that even at low numbers of exemplars, repetition did 
not help increase the magnitude of the structural effect.  
Pooled Analysis
Across four experiments, the structural effect was invariant to exemplar repetition 
whilst the episodic effect greatly increased with repetition.  However, it may be that the 
previous experiments simply did not have sufficient power to detect a change in the 
structural effect.  In this section, we conduct additional analyses to discount this 
explanation.  
Although the structural effect was statistically reliable in the majority of 
conditions across all reported experiments, the associated effect size was much smaller 
than that associated with the episodic effect.  This result suggests that the structural effect 
was small and noisy, which may have masked the moderating influence of repetition.  
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Furthermore, the structural effect may have been unaffected by repetition because some 
participants in the full sample failed to make a structural discrimination at all (i.e., NC 
endorsements = NI endorsements).  These participants may have served to mask any 
effects of repetition in the rest of the sample.  
Two additional analyses were conducted to investigate these possibilities.  The 
first analysis combined the data from all four experiments.  This ensured that the analysis 
had more power than the individual experiment analyses.  The second analysis selectively 
analyzed participants from all four experiments who demonstrated a structural effect that 
was in the 67th percentile or higher (i.e., structural effects that were in the top third).  This 
analysis would thus exclude any participants who failed to make a structural 
discrimination.  
Neither analysis changed the general conclusion. For each analysis a 4 
(Experiment: 1, 2, 3, 4) X 2 (strength: weak, strong) X 2 (task: recognition, classification) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted on the d’s measures.  There were no effects of strength in 
either the ANOVA including all participants, weak d’s M = 0.26 (SE = 0.04), strong d’s  = 
0.25 (SE = 0.04), highest F(1, 209) = 0.70, p = .55. Nor was there an effect of strength for 
the 67th percentile analysis, weak d’s M = 0.63 (SE = 0.05), strong d’s = 0.60 (SE = 0.05), 
highest F(1, 65) = 1.50, p = .23. Thus, even if the analysis included all participants across 
all four experiments or was limited to only those participants who were particularly 
successful at making the structural discrimination, repetition did not increase the 
structural effect.  The results of this analysis strongly support the original conclusions of 
the above experiments that the structural effect does not increase from the weak to the 
strong conditions.  The lack of sensitivity of the structural effect to strength was thus not 
due to a lack of power in the experiments.
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To further investigate whether the data represented an undetected change in the 
structural effect, a Bayesian analysis of the data was conducted. Bayesian analyses have 
the advantage that they can be used to draw inferences about whether there is evidence for 
the null hypothesis or not (see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014 for more infomration on Bayesian 
statistics). Thus, for both all participants and the 67th and above percentile participants, 
the data were collapsed across all variables other than strength, and entered into a 
Bayesian T-test using the JASP v0.9 (REF – JASP Team 2018), with the alternate 
hypothesis set to be that the weak condition was not the same as the strong condition. The 
measure of BF01 was used, which indicates how much more likely the data was if the null 
were true than if the alternate were true. For all participants, the BF01 = 6.47, and for the 
67th percentile participants the BF01 = 3.23.  According to Jeffreys (1961) this constitutes 
“substantial” evidence that the data we observed reflected no actual change in the 
structural effect between weak and strong conditions.     
General Discussion
Across four experiments, we investigated the effect that exemplar repetition had 
on both discrimination between old versus NC items (the episodic effect) and between NC 
versus NI items (the structural effect).  Regardless of whether exemplars were repeated 
three times (Experiments 1 and 2) or five times (Experiments 3 and 4), repetition had 
dissociative effects on the two forms of discrimination. In particular, repeating the 
exemplars greatly boosted the episodic effect, but left the structural effect invariant.  This 
dissociation occurred regardless of whether the rule set was represented by 80 or by 10 
different exemplars (Experiment 4).  Hence, the dissociation cannot be explained by the 
rule set being already fully learned, as the structural effect still did not increase by 
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strength even when it was represented by a smaller number of exemplars. Explanations 
based on a lack of power or a noisy structural effect were investigated and discounted. 
Dissociations analogous to these have been reported previously in the literature, 
but usually as task dissociations. For instance, SRN (Kinder & Shanks, 2001) and 
MINERVA variants such as ATHENA (Curtis & Jamieson, 2019) have been used to 
demonstrate dissociations in study-item strength effects for old/new discrimination in 
recognition compared to NC/NI classification (see also Knowlton et al., 1992). Our 
research differs from that previous research in that we demonstrated the dissociation 
within both the recognition and classification tasks by comparing different items types. 
Most models of implicit learning can account for this dissociation. For example, the 
dissociation is predicted by MINERVA because the extent to which memory traces are 
activated by a probe is a cubic function of the similarity between the traces and the probe. 
This function produces a non-linear generalization gradient such that highly similar traces 
(e.g., old items) have much greater influence than weakly or moderately similar traces 
(e.g., NC items). Hence, strengthening old items (e.g., through repetition or greater 
presentation time) will have a much greater effect on old-item endorsements than NC-
item endorsements, whereas any influence on NI-item endorsements will be negligible.
This discussion makes clear that probe/trace similarity is critical to understanding 
the effect that study strength manipulations will have on the episodic and structural effects 
within MINERVA. If the NC items were highly similar to memory traces, then the effect 
of strength on the structural effect would approach that of the episodic effect. However, it 
is important to point out that even weak NC/trace similarity should be responsive to 
strength under most circumstances. Indeed, current simulations using instance-based 
models suggest that whereas dissociations such as those found in our experiments do 
occur, classification performance still improves to some degree with learning strength 
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(e.g., Curtis & Jamieson, 2019). This is true not just of MINERVA, but of other 
theoretical accounts of implicit learning as well. For example, if learning is based on 
unconscious rule abstraction (e.g. Reber, 1989), then repeated exposure to exemplars 
provides more opportunities for that abstraction to occur. Thus, a central question posed 
by our results is why the structural effect was not sensitive to study strength whilst the 
episodic effect was.
This question is highly relevant given that strength-based enhancement of the 
structural effect should have been particularly likely in our experiments given that the rule 
set was not instantiated with just a few exemplars, but with many different exemplars.    
In what follows, we will consider some potential theoretical accounts as to why the 
structural effect was completely insensitive to strength.
Accounting for the Data
Differentiation.  A possible route to explaining why the structural effect was 
insensitive to strength is through the concept of differentiation.  Differentiation has been 
discussed in both the implicit learning and recognition memory literatures.  For example, 
Vokey and Brooks (1992) gave participants unique mnemonics to assist in encoding AG 
strings (e.g., MVX was associated with Mandy Viewed X-rays).  They found if the items 
were individuated in this way, transfer of learning to new items was reduced.  This led 
Vokey and Brooks to conclude: 
“…learning conditions that result in enhanced retrieval of specific item 
information can decrease the effectiveness of such information to support 
generalization. Apparently, items can be too well differentiated to support 
effectively transfer performance on new items (p. 338).”
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Similarly, the concept of differentiation has been formalized into two models of 
memory: Shiffrin and Steyvers’ (1997) REM model, and McClelland and Chappell’s 
(1998) Subjective Likelihood Model (SLiM).  In both cases, good learning of individual 
exemplars in the study phase of either an implicit learning or recognition memory 
experiment causes those exemplars to become individuated and differentiated from other 
exemplars.  In other words, well-learned exemplars become unique and dissimilar to other 
exemplars because the differences that exist between the well-learned exemplars and the 
other exemplars are also well learned. 
Another example of a model that uses differentiation is the network-based SRN 
model.  One important feature of this model is that it can produce data consistent with our 
findings. For example, SRN simulations produce either no increase or even a decrease in 
NC/NI discrimination with increases in memory strength (Kinder & Shanks, 2001). 
Critically, however, SRNs specifically model sequential relationships such as those 
inherent in AG stimuli. The stimuli used in our experiment used more naturalistic, 
semantic categories of words to define the rule-set, and such stimuli exhibit different 
properties to those used in an AG task (Neil & Higham, 2012). Consequently, it is not 
clear how SRN and similar sequential models would represent the underlying semantic 
information needed to simulate the structural effect in the first place.
Nevertheless, in our own experiments, it is possible differentiation may have 
occurred, resulting in opposing influences acting on repeated NC items in the test phase. 
On the one hand, the repetitions allowed for multiple opportunities to learn the 
commonalties amongst the studied exemplars, which should support good transfer.  On 
the other hand, repetition allowed for more differentiation, which would limit transfer.  
Assuming these opposing influences were approximately equal, the net result would be a 
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structural effect that was invariant as the number of repetitions increased, exactly the 
result that we observed.  
Although enticing, this explanation may be a little too convenient.  It entails that 
these two opposing influences would have to perfectly balance each other across the 
varying conditions of Experiments 1 to 4, including different numbers of repetitions, 
different study and test conditions, and different task types.  Consequently, a sufficient 
explanation for our results would likely need to involve more than just the learning of 
differences and commonality cancelling each other out. 
Processes and representations.  In assessing the reason that the structural effect 
was invariant to repetition, some consideration of what participants might actually be 
learning is warranted.  However, as with most implicit learning experiments, identifying 
the exact source of learning is not necessarily straightforward.  For example, in AGL 
research, several researchers have argued that participants do not learn the underlying 
finite state grammar, but rather respond to the frequency of bigram and trigram chunks in 
the studied items (e.g. Dulany et al., 1984; Perruchet & Pacton, 2006; although see 
Higham, 1997a;).  However, Neil & Higham (2012), using materials similar to those used 
here, demonstrated that something other than chunk learning was the basis of the 
structural effect in their research. Nonetheless, the possibility exists that, just as with AGL 
research, conjunctive rule-set learning involves sensitivity to something correlated with 
the conjunctive rule set rather than the rule set itself.
For example, instead of learning that the words were either concrete or abstract, 
participants might learn that the words are either detectable by the one of the five senses 
or not (e.g., box vs love). Such learning is likely correlated with abstractness and 
concreteness, and thus would still produce a structural effect (as long as this dimension 
was learned in conjunction with lexical frequency or something correlated with lexical 
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frequency).  Another possibility is that the specific meaning of the individual words 
(rather than their concreteness/abstractness or lexical frequency) is somehow correlated 
with the conjunctive rule set. Indeed, Chubala (2016) showed that the structural effect 
observed in Neil and Higham (2012) could be simulated using MINERVA 2 if the vectors 
were derived from semantic space models such as BEAGLE or LSA.  
Critically, however, the importance of our current findings is not dependent on 
precisely ascertaining what was learned.  Regardless of whether participants are learning 
the actual rule set or something correlated with it, repetition should have increased the 
structural effect simply because repetition affords more opportunities for learning.  
However, this increase was not observed in any of our experiments.
An added assumption that could potentially explain the strength-based invariance 
of the structural effect would be that repeated words were processed poorly, adding very 
little to what was learned on the first presentation.  There is some evidence from various 
literatures that such impaired processing of repetitions may occur .  Runger and Frensch 
(2008) demonstrated that expected events are processed less than unexpected events, 
whilst Hintzman and Curran (1995) demonstrated similar poor processing of repeated 
items with their registration-without-learning phenomenon.  With this phenomenon, 
wastage of processing resources was prevented by only fully analyzing novel stimuli 
repeated stimuli were processed only for frequency of occurrence.  Similarly, in the 
context of the spacing effect (e.g., Cepeda, Pashler, Vul, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2006), 
deficient processing theory (e.g., Hintzman, 1974) has been offered as an explanation for 
why massed repetitions are not learned very well. Finally, a similar idea exists in 
associative learning in the form of latent inhibition, again where unsurprising stimuli no 
longer result in associations being formed (Pearce & Hall, 1980).  If the processing of 
repeated words in our experiments was deficient for some reason, then learning may have 
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been impaired, and the structural effect would not increase with strength.  Strength-based 
invariance of the structural effect would occur under these circumstances regardless of 
whether the actual rule set or something correlated with it was being. Models of learning 
and memory could be adapted to simulate such degraded processing of repeated items. 
For instance, repeated stimuli could be assigned a lower L than non-repeated stimuli in 
MINERVA, although it would need to be done in such a way that the episodic effect still 
increased with strength. Whether such degraded processing of repeated stimuli occurred 
here or not is an empirical question which could be investigated in future research. 
Awareness.  As we have noted, none of our participants were able to accurately 
describe the rules on a post-experimental questionnaire, even after being presented with 
the specific criteria that made up the rule set.  However, to further understand our results 
in terms of awareness, we believe it may be fruitful to draw on Dienes and Scott’s (2005) 
distinction between structural knowledge and judgment knowledge.  According to their 
analysis, structural knowledge can be either conscious or unconscious, and the status of 
structural knowledge can be ascertained by analyzing the memory, rules, intuition, and 
guess/random chance attributions, the same attributions we used in our research. 
Specifically, if attributions to memory or rules show a structural effect, then structural 
knowledge is said to be conscious.  Conversely, if attributions to guess/random chance or 
intuition show a structural effect, then structural knowledge is said to be unconscious.  
The fact that we obtained significant structural effects at different points across our tasks 
and experiments with intuition, rules and memory attributions suggests that some portion 
of our participants’ responses constituted conscious structural knowledge (i.e., structural 
effect for either memory or rules) and some portion constituted unconscious structural 
knowledge (structural effect for intuition).  However, it is interesting to note that even for 
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items for which there was conscious structural knowledge by Dienes and Scott’s (2005) 
analysis, participants were still unable to verbalize the structure.  
In the experiments above, we measured judgement knowledge using the CDS 
measure. According to Dienes and Scott (2005), unconscious structural knowledge can be 
associated with either conscious or unconscious judgment knowledge.  For example, 
intuition attributions yielding a structural effect (unconscious structural knowledge) may 
have a CDS above chance (conscious judgment knowledge) or a CDS at chance 
(unconscious judgment knowledge), and the same is true of guess/random chance 
attributions.  Although we did not examine specifically CDS as a function of attribution 
type, it is worth noting that CDS scores were above chance in several conditions across 
the experiments, which suggests that judgment knowledge was conscious.  Furthermore, 
the CDS scores increased with strength whereas the structural effect (i.e., structural 
knowledge) did not.  Hence, if one uses CDS to measure judgment knowledge as distinct 
from structural knowledge, then the dissociative pattern of endorsements versus 
confidence ratings that we observed in our experiments has a theoretical foundation.  
Specifically, our results suggest that exemplar repetition does not affect structural 
knowledge (conscious or unconscious) but it does affect the acquisition of conscious 
judgment knowledge.  In our view, it is important to investigate this possibility in future 
research.
Final Thoughts
The fact that the recognition and classification tasks produced similar data 
demonstrates that there should be closer links between recognition and implicit-learning 
literatures.  A link between classification and recognition is not a new concept – for 
instance, Higham (1997b; Higham & Brooks, 1997) as well as others (e.g., Vokey & 
Brooks, 1992; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) have pointed out the fact that both tasks seem 
Page 48 of 78Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021819873838
Running head: REPETITION EFFECTS ON IMPLICIT LEARNING 49
to be performed using the same processes.  In fact, in the context of implicit learning 
theories, it would seem to be difficult not to talk about recognition memory at the same 
time as classification.  Study of the differences between the two task types could also be 
revealing, and computational models will need to account for how performance may 
differ in response to task demands.
That the structural effect did not increase with strength over four experiments is a 
surprising result.  Although we have speculated as to why this may be the case, future 
research needs to put these speculations to the test.  For now, the unresponsiveness of the 
structural effect to repetition remains a puzzle that models of memory and learning will 
need to solve.
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Footnotes
1 The term guess has several meanings and is therefore prone to different interpretations.  To avoid 
this confusion in our participants, the term guess was replaced with random chance – see Scott and Dienes 
(2008) Experiment 3. 
2 d’e was calculated by subtracting the z transformed NC endorsement rate from the z old 
endorsement rate.  d’s was calculated by subtracting the z NI rate from the z NC rate.  Traditional signal-
detection theory calculates d’ using hit and false-alarm rates. However, since the NC rate is a false-alarm 
rate in recognition and a hit rate in classification this terminology has been avoided.  
3 In previous research (e.g. Dienes et al., 1995) CDS was computed for NC items versus NI items 
in classification rather than recognition. In classification, endorsing the former item type constitutes a 
correct response whereas endorsing the latter constitutes an error.  As such, CDS becomes a measure of 
metacognitive resolution, the degree to which people can monitor the correctness of their responding. In 
recognition, however, endorsement of any new item constitutes an error, regardless of whether the item is 
consistent or inconsistent with the rule structure. Therefore, in recognition, any difference in confidence is 
not a measure of metacognitive resolution per se.  However, although the meaning of CDS is somewhat 
different in classification versus recognition, it is still useful for assessing the subjective experience 
associated with endorsing the different stimulus types and can still be used to index awareness: if 
confidence is higher for endorsements of NC versus NI items, then the rule structure is affecting 
participants’ subjective experience, which is a form of awareness.  This conclusion is true regardless of 
whether the task is classification or recognition.
4 Reduced degrees of freedom in the analysis were due to cases dropped with no endorsements for 
either NC or NI stimuli
5 As noted above, this condition may not hold for theories of implicit learning based on memory 
for surface features with our materials because chunk frequency is constant between NC and NI items (Neil 
& Higham, 2012).
6  Careful readers may note that the structural effect for classification was smaller than for 
recognition and was not significantly above zero in either the weak or strong conditions.  However, it is 
worth making two points in this regard.  First, the structural effect in classification was significantly above 
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zero if the weak and strong conditions were pooled (see Table 7), suggesting the failure to find a significant 
effect in either the weak or strong condition alone was a power issue.  Second, the structural effects in both 
Experiments 1 and 3 were comparable between classification and recognition, suggesting that the larger 
effect observed in Experiment 2 for recognition is not reliable.
7 The materials used in this experiment can be found in the supplementary materials.
Figure Captions
Figure 1 – Signal detection model for Experiments 1 to 3.  Participants are assumed to 
rely on a yes/no criterion (C) applied to the strength-of-evidence dimension to make both 
recognition and classification judgments. Old = words seen at study, new = words not 
seen at study, NC = New rule-consistent words, NI = New rule-inconsistent words, d’s = 
Structural signal detection measure d’, d’e = episodic signal detection measure d’.
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 Figure 1 – Signal detection model for Experiments 1 to 3.  Participants are assumed to rely on a yes/no 
criterion (C) applied to the strength-of-evidence dimension to make both recognition and classification 
judgments. Old = words seen at study, new = words not seen at study, NC = New rule-consistent words, NI 
= New rule-inconsistent words, d’s = Structural signal detection measure d’, d’e = episodic signal detection 
measure d’. 
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Table 1
Mean (SE) Endorsement Rates by Strength, Task Type and Word Type in Experiment 1 
Strength
Task and word type Weak Strong
Recognition
Old .88 (.02) .92 (.02)
NC .18 (.03) .15 (.02)
NI .13 (.03) .11 (.02)
Classification
Old .87 (.02) .93 (.02)
NC .32 (.04) .31 (.04)
NI .26 (.04) .22 (.03)
Note: Old = words seen at study, NC = New rule-consistent words, NI = New rule-
inconsistent words.
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Table 2
Mean Episodic Effect (d’e) and Structural Effect (d’s) as a Function of Study Strength and 
Task Type in Experiment 1 (SE in brackets) 
Strength
Task and d’ type Weak Strong Total
Recognition
d’e 2.36* (.14) 2.80* (.18) 2.58* (.11)
d’s .30* (.10) .24* (.06) .27* (.06)
Classification
d’e 1.88* (.18) 2.29* (.11)* 2.09* (.11)
d’s .21* (.09) .30* (.09)* .26* (.06)
Both tasks
d’e 2.12* (.13) 2.55* (.13) 2.33* (.09)
d’s .25* (.07) .27* (.07) .26* (.05)
Note:  * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0. 
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Table 3
Final Questionnaire Section Mean Endorsement Rates for Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Criterion
Experiment 1 
Endorsements
Experiment 2 
Endorsements
Experiment 3 
Endorsements
Experiment 4 
Endorsements
Length 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.21
Syllables 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07
Category 
(noun/verb) 0.24 0.44 0.23 0.34
Letters 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.07
Meaning 0.31 0.25 0.34 0.30
Familiarity 0.38 0.11 0.17 0.15
Frequency 0.38 0.25 0.34 0.20
Association 0.36 0.39 0.48 0.46
Position 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.09
Concreteness 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10
Note:  Endorsement rates are calculated as a proportion of the total possible selections for that 
criterion.  Because participants were required to select 2 criteria, these rates sum to 2.
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Table 4
Mean Chan’s Difference Scores Comparing NC with NI Endorsement Confidence by 
Strength, and Task Type in Experiment 1 (SE in brackets)
Task
Weak Strong Total
Recognition 4.17* (1.93) 4.38* (2.05) 4.28* (1.41)
Classification 0.31 (1.62) 4.35* (1.72) 2.33* (1.18)
Both Tasks 2.24 (1.39) 4.37* (1.48) 3.30* (1.02)
Note:  * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0.  NC = new 
consistent; NI = new inconsistent.
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Table 5
Mean Structural Effect by Task Type, Study Strength and Attribution in 
Experiment 1 (SE in brackets)
Weak study Strong studyTask Type
Random 
Chance
Intuition Memory Rules Random 
Chance
Intuition Memory Rules
Recognition .008 
(.009)
.015 
(.013)
.041* 
(.010)*
-.004 
(.004)
-.003 
(.009)
.030* 
(.013)
.013 
(.010)
.001 
(.004)
Classification -.010 
(.012)
.042* 
(.017)
.019 
(.011)
.015 
(.014)
.010 
(.012)
.028 
(.017)
.036* 
(.011)
.016 
(.014)
Note:  * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0.
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Table 6
Mean (SE) Endorsement Rates by Strength, Word Type and Task Type from Experiment 2 
Strength
Task and word type
Weak Strong
Recognition
Old .71 (.04) .80 (.02)
NC .34 (.04) .26 (.02)
NI .26 (.04) .18 (.03)
Classification
Old .67 (.04) .80 (.04)
NC .40 (.05) .41 (.04)
NI .33 (.05) .36 (.04)
Note: Old = words seen at study, NC = New rule-consistent words, NI = New rule-
inconsistent words.
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Table 7
Mean Episodic Effect (d’e) and Structural Effect (d’s) as a Function of Study Strength and 
Task Type in Experiment 2 (SE in brackets)
Strength
Task and d’ type Weak Strong Total
Recognition
d’e 1.04* (.10) 1.54* (.11) 1.39* (.08)
d’s .29* (.07) .35* (.09) .32* (.06)
Classification
d’e .76* (.10) 1.20* (.15) .98* (.08)
d’s .17 (.11) .14 (.08) .16* (.06)
Both Tasks
d’e .91* (.07) 1.38* (.09) 1.14* (.06)
d’s .23* (.06) .25* (.06) .24* (.04)
Note: * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0.
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Table 8
Mean Chan’s Difference Scores Comparing NC with NI Endorsement Confidence by 
Strength, and Task Type in Experiment 2 (SE in brackets)
Task
Weak Strong Total
Recognition -2.09 (1.74) 4.48* (1.74) 1.20 (1.23)
Classification -0.48 (1.87) 0.86 (1.87) 0.19 (1.32)
Both Tasks -1.28 (1.28) 2.67* (1.28) 0.69 (0.90)
Note:  * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0. NC = new 
consistent; NI = new inconsistent.
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Table 9
Mean Structural Effect by Task Type, Study Strength and Attribution in 
Experiment 2 (SE in brackets)
Weak study Strong studyTask Type
Random 
Chance
Intuition Memory Rules Random 
Chance
Intuition Memory Rules
Recognition .022 
(.015)
.047* 
(.018)
.013 
(.018)
.005 
(.013)
.014 
(.015)
.029 
(.018)
.033 
(.018)
.015 
(.014)
Classification .023 
(.016)
.029 
(.018)
-.012 
(.020)
0.053* 
(.014)
.004 
(.016)
.005 
(.020)
-.004 
(.020)
.035* 
(.014)
Note:  * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0.
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Table 10
Mean (SE) Endorsement Rates by Strength, Word Type and Task Type in Experiment 3 
Strength
Task and word type
Weak Strong
Recognition
Old .67 (.03) .81 (.03)
NC .34 (.03) .22 (.03)
NI .24 (.03) .15 (.03)
Classification
Old .70 (.03) .86 (.04)
NC .50 (.05) .36 (.05)
NI .38 (.05) .25 (.04)
Note: Old = words seen at study, NC = New rule-consistent words, NI = New rule-
inconsistent words.
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Table 11
The Episodic Effect (d’e) and Structural Effect (d’s) as a Function of Strength and Task Type 
in Experiment 3 (SE in brackets)
Strength
Task and d’ type Weak Strong Total
Recognition
d’e .90* (.09) 1.89* (.22) 1.38* (.15)
d’s .32* (.10) .29* (.10) .30* (.07)
Classification
d’e .58* (.13) 1.80* (.23) 1.19* (.17)
d’s .34* (.08) .33* (.10) .33* (.06)
Both Tasks
d’e .74* (.08) 1.85* (.16) 1.29* (.11)
d’s .33* (.06) .31* (.07) .32* (.05)
Total .53* (.07) 1.08* (.07) .81* (.04)
Note: * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0.
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Table 12
Mean Chan’s Difference Scores Comparing NC with NI Endorsement Confidence by 
Strength, and Task Type in Experiment 3 (SE in brackets)
Task
Weak Strong Total
Recognition 0.64 (1.94) 6.51* (2.01) 3.58* (1.40)
Classification 0.88 (1.94) 4.49* (1.94) 2.69* (1.37)
Both Tasks 0.76 (1.37) 5.50* (1.40) 3.13* (0.98)
Note:  * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0.  NC = new 
consistent; NI = new inconsistent.
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Table 13
Mean Structural Effect by Task Type, Study Strength and Attribution in 
Experiment 3 (SE in brackets)
Weak study Strong studyTask Type
Random 
Chance
Intuition Memory Rules Random 
Chance
Intuition Memory Rules
Recognition .019 
(.013)
.061* 
(.018)
.003 
(.015)
.005 
(.014)
.009 
(.014)
.011 
(.018)
.041* 
(.015)
.003 
(.014)
Classification .000 
(.013)
.031 
(.018)
.039* 
(.015)
.050* 
(.014)
.011 
(.013)
.031 
(.018)
.016 
(.015)
.049* 
(.014)
Note:  * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0.
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Table 14
Mean (SE) Endorsement Rates by Strength, Word Type and Variety in Experiment 4 
Strength
Task and Variety Weak Strong
10 Words
NC .39 (.02) .34 (.02)
NI .35 (.02) .29 (.02)
80 Words
NC .40 (.02) .46 (.03)
NI .34 (.02) .35 (.02)
Note: NC = New rule-consistent words, NI = New rule-inconsistent words.
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Table 15
The Structural Effect (d’s) as a Function of Strength and Variety in Experiment 4 (SE in 
brackets)
Strength
Variety type Weak Strong Total
10 words .12* (.05) .14* (.05) 0.13* (.04)
80 words .18* (.06) .30* (.06) 0.24* (.04)
Total .15* (.04) .22* (.04)
Note: * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0. NC = new 
consistent; NI = new inconsistent.
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Table 16
Mean Chan’s Difference Scores Comparing NC with NI Endorsement Confidence by 
Strength, and Variety in Experiment 4 (SE in brackets)
Task
Weak Strong Total
10 Words -0.25 (0.90) 2.81* (0.90) 1.28* (0.63)
80 Words -0.17 (0.97) 4.49* (1.03) 1.45* (0.71)
Total -0.21 (0.66) 2.94* (0.68)
Note:  * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0.  
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Table 17
Mean Structural Effect by Task Type, Study Strength and Attribution in 
Experiment 4 (SE in brackets)
Weak study Strong studyTask Type
Random 
Chance
Intuition Memory Rules Random 
Chance
Intuition Memory Rules
10 Words -0.02* 
(.009)
0.02 
(.011)
0.02* 
(.009)
0.03* 
(.011)
0.00 
(.006)
0.02 
(.011)
0.01 
(.010)
0.02 
(0.013)
80  Words 0.02* 
(.008)
.010 
(.015)
0.02 
(.012)
0.01 
(.015)
0.01 
(.009)
0.01 
(.015)
0.05* 
(.015)
0.05* 
(.017)
Note:  * = Lower bound of 95% confidence interval above chance level of 0.
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